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Reinhardt at Work
In his thirty years as a judge, Stephen Reinhardt has authored more than
150 labor and employment opinions for the Ninth Circuit.! Indeed, it would be
hard to identify a single question concerning the law of work about which
Judge Reinhardt has not written at least one major decision. In addition to its
sheer size and scope, Judge Reinhardt's jurisprudence also reflects a remarkable
grasp of the overall structure of U.S. labor and employment law. From
questions as fundamental as who is an employee' and what constitutes work,'
to issues as complex and esoteric as how to define common situs picketing,' the
Judge is at home and at ease in this area of law. At their best, Reinhardt's labor
and employment opinions display a technical virtuosity impressive to both
seasoned practitioners and legal academics. This feature of his opinions should
come as no surprise: Judge Reinhardt practiced as a labor lawyer before taking
the bench in 1980 (making him nearly unique among his colleagues on the
AUTHOR. Assistant Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. Professor Sachs clerked for Judge
Reinhardt from 1998 to 1999. The author thanks Rebecca Livengood for excellent research
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1. According to a search of both LexisNexis and Westlaw, Judge Reinhardt is the author of 153
majority opinions in labor and employment cases, including panel and en banc decisions.
2. See, e.g., Donovan v. Sureway Cleaners, 656 F.2d 1368 (9 th Cir. 1981).
3. See, e.g., Ballaris v. Wacker Siltronic Corp., 370 F.3 d 901 (9th Cir. 2004).
4. See, e.g., NLRB v. Ironworkers Local 433, 850 F.2d 551 (9 th Cir. 1988). As the leading treatise
defines it, "[a] common situs is a site on which two or more employers are engaged in normal
business operations." 2 SECTION OF LABOR & EMP'T LAw, AM. BAR Ass'N, THE DEVELOPING
LABOR LAW § 22.II.C.2, at 1768 (John E. Higgins, Jr. et al. eds., sth ed. 2oo6). The issue is
relevant to the question of whether picketing is permissible. See Ironworkers Local 433, 850
F.2d at 553-54.
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federal courts of appealss), and he came to his judgeship already possessing a
firm grasp of the statutory and decisional landscape.
But the Judge's labor and employment jurisprudence is defined by more
than its scope and technical accomplishment. In fact, Judge Reinhardt's
writing in these areas is recognizable both for a consistent substantive vision of
what labor and employment law intends to accomplish and for the Judge's
method of interpreting these statutes. The substantive theme that runs
through these opinions is a straightforward one: labor and employment
statutes are written to enable workers' own efforts to make their lives better.
He views the law as a vehicle for, and a facilitator of, worker empowerment -a
view, at bottom, that labor and employment statutes do not merely grant
particular workplace rights, but, perhaps more importantly, enable workers to
fight for themselves.
Running alongside this substantive vision of labor and employment law is
a tool of interpretation that the Judge deploys to resolve these cases. Namely,
the Judge relies on his own understanding - informed by years of practice -of
how law actually operates in the world of work, in the world of union
organizing, and in the world of labor-management relations. His opinions are
full of references to what the Judge, humbly of course, refers to as "reality"-
the "realities of collective bargaining,, 6 the "reality of day-to-day labor
relations,"' and "the practical realities of labor-management relations."" What
these phrases capture is the Judge's insistence that labor and employment
statutes be interpreted pragmatically. He demands that the court understand
how things actually work before deciding how the law should be construed.
Although many cases could be cited to highlight these themes, three will
serve our purpose here. The first concerns the scope of the anti-retaliation
clause of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). 9 The second deals with the
ability of undocumented immigrant workers to assert rights granted by Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1 And the third takes up the ability of
unions to spend dues money on organizing new workers." Because each of
5. Though not entirely unique: for example, Judge Marsha Berzon, also of the Ninth Circuit,
was a prominent labor attorney before joining the court.
6. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1036 v. NLRB, 307 F. 3d 760, 768 ( 9 th
Cir. 2002) (en banc).
7. Ironworkers Local 433, 850 F.2d at 556.
8. Peterson v. Kennedy, 771 F.2d 1244, 1258 (9 th Cir. 1985).
9. See Lambert v. Ackerley, 18o F.3d 997 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
lo. See Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2004).




these opinions is significant in a number of additional ways -beyond the two
themes that are the focus here -this Feature will also note some of the cases'
broader implications.
1. ANTI-RETALIATION PROTECTION
Judge Reinhardt's concern for worker empowerment -his view of the law
as protecting workers' ability to fight for themselves, not simply as extending
workplace entitlements -is expressed first and foremost in cases dealing with
employer retaliation. Perhaps the best example comes in the context of the Fair
Labor Standards Act. The FLSA sets the federal minimum wage and requires
that covered employees receive overtime premium pay: if a covered employee
works more than forty hours in a week, she is entitled to earn one and one-half
times her regular rate for the overtime hours." The statute, through its anti-
retaliation clause, also offers protection to employees who seek to enforce these
rights."
In the early 199os, the Seattle SuperSonics (Sonics) -at the time, an NBA
basketball team-began paying its ticket sales agents $166.67 a month in
"overtime pay" regardless of how many hours of overtime the agents actually
worked." Believing, correctly, that this pay scheme was illegal and in
contravention of the FLSA's overtime provisions, a group of sales agents
decided to request that management reform the pay practice. They chose two
"representatives" to deal with management- including the named plaintiff,
Laura Lambert-and succeeded in convincing the Sonics's management to pay
the agents the actual overtime wages that were owed. Nonetheless, less than a
week after the Sonics settled the workers' overtime claim, the team reorganized
its ticket sales operations. As a result, all of the agents involved in the effort to
secure overtime pay were fired; in fact, the one agent not dismissed by the
Sonics was the one agent who had not complained about the Sonics's payment
scheme."
The case seemed like a clear-cut example of illegal retaliation. A Seattle jury
agreed: it awarded the agents nearly $700,000 in lost wages and $12 million in
punitive damages.' 6 On appeal, however, a three-judge panel of the Ninth
12. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, 206-207 (20o6).
13. See id. § 215(a)(3).
14. See Lambert, 180 F.3d at iooi.
15. See id. at 1001-02.
i6. See id. at 1002. The punitive damages award was remitted to approximately $4 million. See
id.
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Circuit held that the anti-retaliation clause of the FLSA does not apply when
workers complain to their employers about violations of the Act." The clause
makes it illegal for an employer to discharge or discriminate against any
employee because the employee has "filed any complaint ... under or related to
this chapter."1" The panel read the statutory term "filed" to mean filed with a
court or with the U.S. Department of Labor. On this reading of the statute,
because Lambert and the other agents had taken their complaint to Sonics
management, they had not "filed" a complaint within the meaning of the
statute, and thus there was no cognizable retaliation.
Rehearing the case en banc, the Ninth Circuit vacated the panel's decision
in an opinion written by Judge Reinhardt. In holding that the FLSA anti-
retaliation clause covers complaints made to employers, Judge Reinhardt's
opinion begins by setting out a substantive vision of the statute's purpose.
Most broadly, and quoting from a 1944 Supreme Court decision, the opinion
argues that the FLSA is "remedial and humanitarian in purpose" and
continues: "'We are not here dealing with mere chattels or articles of trade but
with the rights of those who toil . . . . Those are rights that Congress has
specifically legislated to protect. Such a statute must not be interpreted or applied
in a narrow, grudging manner."
More particularly, the opinion stresses that FLSA enforcement depends
upon workers coming forward to assert their rights under the statute, and thus
the statutory scheme can function only if the anti-retaliation clause eliminates
the "fear of economic retaliation."2 o In Judge Reinhardt's words:
The FLSA's anti-retaliation clause is designed to ensure that employees
are not compelled to risk their jobs in order to assert their wage and
hour rights under the Act. Construing the anti-retaliation provision to
exclude from its protection all those employees who seek to obtain fair
treatment and a remedy for a perceived violation of the Act from their
employers would jeopardize the protection promised by the provision
and discourage employees from asserting their rights."
Having reached a conclusion about the meaning of the anti-retaliation
clause by examining the purpose and structure of the statute, the opinion then
17. See id.
18. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3).
ig. Lambert, 18o F.3d at 1003 (alteration in original) (quoting Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. v.
Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 597 (1944)).
2o. Id.




turns to examine the particular words of the clause. Here the Judge's practical
experience is brought to bear. Unlike the panel, the en banc court finds that the
phrase "filed any complaint" is broad enough to reach complaints, like the one
here, made directly to employers. Why? Because, as Judge Reinhardt points
out, in the parlance of the workplace, employees file grievances -usually in
union shops, but in some non-union firms as well-with their employers.
Finding it reasonable to assume that Congress was aware of this practice in
1938 when it drafted the FLSA, the court holds that complaints "filed" with
employers are sufficient to satisfy the statute's requirement."
The Lambert opinion makes this point in a brief sentence or two, but it is
worth pausing to observe that the point is undoubtedly correct. Indeed, at the
time Congress drafted the FLSA and its anti-retaliation clause, the National
Labor Relations Board itself used the term "filed" to describe internal firm
grievance procedures. 3 Collective bargaining agreements drafted at the time
also spoke of the "filing" of grievances by employees with their union or their
employers. For example, the collective bargaining agreement signed in July
1937 between Teamsters Local 584 and Sheffield Farms Company stated that
"[a]ny employee having a grievance shall have the privilege of filing such
grievance with the steward within three days."' The same terminology is used
to this day, with collective bargaining agreements routinely speaking of the
"filing" of grievances or complaints by employees with employers, even in cases
where the grievance is "filed" orally.
22. The Supreme Court recently has granted certiorari to resolve a closely related question:
whether oral complaints made to employers satisfy the requirements of the Fair Labor
Standards Act's anti-retaliation clause. See Brief for the Petitioner at i, Kasten v. Saint-
Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., No. o9-834 (June 16, 2010), 201o WL 2481867.
23. See, e.g., In re Republic Steel Corp., 9 N.L.R.B. 219, 232 (1938) ("Requests for changes in
rates of pay were to be considered closed upon a decision of the proper committee of
Employee Representatives and the Management, unless an appeal was filed in writing by an
employee or his Representative with the Management Representative within a period of 3
days after the decision was rendered.") (emphasis added).
24. In re Basile, 10 N.Y.S.2d 24, 25 (N.Y. Spec. Term 1938).
25. As one court has observed, in the standard collective bargaining agreement, "[i]n order to
set the machinery of the grievance process in motion, the aggrieved employee [is] required
to file a complaint with his or her immediate supervisor." Dalton v. Jefferson Smurfit Corp.
(U.S.), 979 F. Supp. 1187, 1189 (S.D. Ohio 1997). By way of example, the collective
bargaining agreement in force between the Service Employees International Union, Local
119 9E-DC, and Maryland General Hospital states that "[all grievances shall be presented
orally ... but the date of filing same shall be recorded on a form provided by the Hospital."
Agreement Between Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, AFL-CIO Dist. 1199E-DC & Md. Gen. Hosp.
5 13.4 (Dec. 1, 1999) (on file with author); see also, e.g., Agreement Between Commc'ns
Workers of Am. & Bell Ad. N.J., Inc. art. 74 (Aug. 9, 1998), available at
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The Lambert opinion thus protects employees' ability to secure their own
rights at work, and does so by relying on Judge Reinhardt's practical reasoning
about the world of work. Beyond highlighting these twin themes of
Reinhardt's labor and employment jurisprudence, the opinion also has a
broader significance, one that impacts employees' ability to use employment
law as a channel for collective action. As many have now explained, the federal
statute expressly designed to protect workers' collective efforts to improve their
work lives - the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) - is largely
dysfunctional. That law's narrow range of coverage, its weak remedies, and its
time-consuming procedures mean that workers' rights to engage in concerted
activity for mutual aid and protection are violated with near impunity. 6 In the
face of the NLRA's failure, one potential alternative legal channel lies in
employment laws like the FLSA. Workers can, and do, rely on employment
statutes as both the locus of their collective efforts to secure workplace change
and as the legal architecture that protects such collective action." The ability of
employment laws to function in this way turns, however, on the reach of the
statutes' anti-retaliation clauses. By reading such clauses narrowly, courts
foreclose one of the few viable avenues for workers' collective action. On the
other hand, by reading these clauses broadly, courts enable a partial but
important response to the pathology of the NLRA. In this light, then, Judge
Reinhardt's opinion in Lambert provides employees with the opportunity to
replace a failed statutory regime with a workable alternative: to use
employment law as a form of labor law.
II. INSULATING WORKERS FROM IMMIGRATION-BASED
RETALIATION
Lambert is in many ways the classic retaliation case: employees go to their
employer to demand compliance with an employment statute, and they get
fired for doing so. As the opinion makes clear, this type of employer conduct
creates a "'fear of economic retaliation"' that is quite effective at deterring
workers from attempting to vindicate workplace rights." For immigrant
http://irle.berkeley.edu/library/pdf/o298.pdf ("Fourteen (14) days from the date the
grievance is filed shall be allowed for adjustment of the grievance. . . .").
26. See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification ofAmerican Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527
(2002).
27. For a discussion, see Benjamin I. Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REv.
2685 (2o8).
28. Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1003 (9th Cit. 1999) (en banc) (quoting Mitchell v.




workers, however, the fear of economic retaliation can be compounded by fears
of immigration-based reprisal. Immigrant workers, that is, may be deterred
from seeking to enforce workplace rights by the fear that their immigration
status will become the focus of employer retribution.
This issue came before the Ninth Circuit in Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc." The
case involved twenty-three Latina and Southeast Asian female immigrants who
worked on the production line at NIBCO's factory in Fresno, California.
Although their job descriptions did not require English proficiency, NIBCO
required the plaintiffs to take basic job skills examinations given only in
English. The plaintiffs sued, alleging disparate impact discrimination based on
national origin in violation of Title VII, and sought reinstatement along with
back pay and punitive damages. During Martha Rivera's deposition, the
employer's counsel asked Rivera where she was born; plaintiffs' counsel then
moved for a protective order barring any further questions related to the
plaintiffs' immigration status.3 0
The circuit court heard an appeal from the district court's grant of the
protective order. Judge Reinhardt's opinion begins, and in many ways ends, by
casting the employer's deposition request as a threat: by asking about Rivera's
immigration status, the court understands the employer implicitly to threaten
Rivera with immigration consequences for her Title VII action. Such a threat is
impermissible because -much like the employer's conduct in Lambert -it will
have the effect of inhibiting workers' willingness to come forward and assert
workplace rights. As Judge Reinhardt put it:
Granting employers the right to inquire into workers' immigration
status in cases like this would allow them to raise implicitly the threat
of deportation and criminal prosecution every time a worker,
documented or undocumented, reports illegal practices or files a Title
VII action. Indeed, were we to direct district courts to grant discovery
requests for information related to immigration status in every case
involving national origin discrimination under Title VII, countless acts
of illegal and reprehensible conduct would go unreported."
This understanding of the employer's discovery request reflects, again,
Judge Reinhardt's appreciation for the practical world of work. In Judge
Reinhardt's view-one that is borne out by even a cursory review of the
evidence- immigration status is used as a tool to deter enforcement of
29. 364 F.3 d 1057 (9 th Cir. 2004).
30. See id. at o61.
31. Id. at lo65.
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workplace rights." Returning to a favorite phrase, Judge Reinhardt thus writes
that undocumented workers face an even "harsher reality" than documented
workers; in addition to economic retaliation, these workers can face
deportation or criminal proceedings when they claim rights at work.33 Enabling
immigrant workers to make such claims therefore requires that courts put
immigration status off limits to this kind of discovery request.
NIBCO is more than a discovery case, however. In fact, the opinion is of
major relevance to the general jurisprudence of workplace rights for
undocumented workers, a population that now includes about eight million
people.34 For several decades, the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals
fairly consistently read the definition of "employee" within labor and
employment statutes to extend to undocumented immigrants.s In the 2002
case of Hoffman Plastic Compounds, however, the Supreme Court held that the
NLRB may not award back pay to an undocumented immigrant who is
discharged for engaging in protected union activity." Ho an makes it more
difficult for workers -both the undocumented and those who work alongside
them-to organize unions. But the Hoffinan decision also raised the possibility
that courts would begin to curtail the rights of undocumented employees
under other federal labor and employment statutes. In NIBCO, the employer
made an argument common in the years following Hoffinan: by foreclosing
remedies for undocumented immigrants under the NLRA, the Supreme Court
32. See id. at 1o64 (citing Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 886-87 (1984) (discussing how
an employer reported five undocumented workers after they voted in favor of union
representation)); Singh v. Jutla & C.D. & R's Oil, Inc., 214 F. Supp. 2d lo56, 1057 (N.D. Cal.
2002); Contreras v. Corinthian Vigor Ins. Brokerage, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1055 (N.D.
Cal. 1998); see also Montero v. INS, 124 F.3d 381 (2d Cir. 1997).
33. NIBCO, 364 F. 3d at lo64.
34. See JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D'VERA COHN, PEW HISPANIC CTR., A PORTRAIT OF UNAUTHORIZED
IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES, at i (2009), available at http://pewhispanic.org/
reports/report.php?ReportlD= 107.
35. See, e.g., Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. 883; NLRB v. A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Grp., Inc., 134 F.3d 50
(2d Cit. 1997). For some contrary positions, see, for example, Agri Processor Co. v. NLRB, 514
F.3d 1, 10-i5 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting), which argues that undocumented
immigrants are not employees within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act; and
Egbuna v. Time-Life Libraries, Inc., 153 F. 3 d 184 (4 th Cit. 1998), which held that
undocumented immigrants are not "qualified" for employment for purposes of Title VII
remedies.
36. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002). The holding applies in
cases where the employer is not aware of the worker's immigration status at the time of hire.





has barred undocumented immigrants from seeking remedies under the full
range of labor and employment statutes.
NIBCO constitutes something of a bulwark against such overbroad
readings of Hoffinan. In rejecting the employer's claim, the NIBCO court drew
out three salient differences between the Title VII regime and the NLRA."
First, the court pointed out that the NLRA depends on agency enforcement,
while Title VII relies heavily on private enforcement actions. Second, unlike in
the NLRA, Congress provided Title VII plaintiffs with remedies, including
punitive damages, designed to punish and deter employers who violate the
statute. Finally, the Ninth Circuit stressed the fact that the Hoffinan holding
was grounded, in part, on the Supreme Court's unwillingness to defer to the
NLRB's balancing of two competing federal statutes-labor law and
immigration law. In a Title VII case, on the other hand, it is a federal court that
does this balancing, and courts -the Ninth Circuit held -are precisely the right
institutions to harmonize competing federal laws. This reasoning is important,
not only because it clarifies why Hoffman is inapposite in the Title VII context.
Its broader significance is that it reveals why Hoffman does not reach the many
other employment regimes that share Title VII's structure rather than the
NLRA's.
NIBCO is significant in a final, and perhaps even broader, way. Numerous
courts have been called on to harmonize immigration and labor law -to resolve
whether and how immigration status impacts the operation of federal labor
and employment statutes. 8 If there is a common refrain in these cases, it is that
immigration status simply trumps labor rights." The cases that lie at the
intersection of labor and immigration law, that is, do not reflect a careful
balancing of these two statutory regimes. To the contrary, the cases evince an
almost reflexive prioritization of immigration status over labor protections.
NIBCO, of course, stands in stark contrast to this approach. The opinion takes
seriously both federal regimes and, without impinging on the possibility for
immigration enforcement, the decision allows for robust enforcement of
workplace rights.
37. NIBCO, 364 F.3d at lo67-69.
38. See, e.g., Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 535 U.S. 137.
39. One clear example of this trend comes from a case, Montero v. INS, in which the Second
Circuit summarized the rule in this way: "[The] application of prospective labor law
remedies to undocumented aliens consistently has been dependent upon whether the alien is
permitted by the INS to remain in the United States." 124 F.3d 381, 384-85 (2d Cit. 1997).
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III.UNION ORGANIZING
Our final case comes from the union context; and when it comes to legal
protection for workers' efforts to improve their own terms and conditions of
employment, the most obvious statutory source is the NLRA. Passed in 1935,
that statute grants workers the right to engage in concerted activity for their
mutual aid and protection. 40 Judge Reinhardt has authored a slew of opinions
applying, and giving broad readings to, the core provisions of the NLRA." But
to illustrate the twin themes of this Feature, it is best to look at a relatively
recent decision involving unions' ability to organize new members.
In United Food and Commercial Workers Union, Local 1o36 v. NLRB
(UFCW), the union represented employees of .several retail food
establishments and sought to organize more firms in the same competitive
market.4 ' A number of workers in the current bargaining unit objected to the
union's use of their dues to organize new workers, and they charged the union
with committing an unfair labor practice. The doctrinal background for the
case came from the Supreme Court's Communications Workers of America v.
Beck decision." There, the Court held, inter alia, that a collective bargaining
agreement may require all employees in a bargaining unit-even those
individual "objectors" who do not want to be in the union -to pay union dues.
But, according to the Beck Court, objectors may only be required to pay those
dues that are "germane to collective bargaining."44 In Beck, the Court held
explicitly that politics was not germane to collective bargaining, and so the
union could not charge objectors for any of its political expenditures. But the
Beck Court left open the broader question of which nonpolitical expenses were
in fact germane to collective bargaining.
In the UFCW case, a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit held that
organizing new union members was insufficiently related to bargaining on
behalf of existing members to meet Beck's test for germaneness. 4s For the three-
judge panel, organizing additional employees and representing existing
members were distinct enterprises -both part of the union's overall mission
40. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (20o6).
41. See, e.g., N. Mont. Health Care Ctr. v. NLRB, 178 F.3d 1089 (9th Cir. 1999); NLRB v.
Wilder Constr. Co., 804 F.2d 1122 (9 th Cir. 1986); NLRB v. Cam Indus., Inc., 666 F.2d 411
(9 th Cir. 1982).
42. 249 F. 3 d 1115 (9th Cit. 2001).
43. 487 U.S- 735 (1988).
44. Id. at 745.




but not related closely enough to warrant the imposition on objectors. But, in
Judge Reinhardt's opinion for the en banc Ninth Circuit, the court reversed.
The heart of the opinion begins with a statement about statutory purpose:
"Organizing," Judge Reinhardt writes, "is central to the purpose of the
NLRA."46 It is only through organizing, the opinion continues, that workers
can hope to bargain collectively to improve the terms and conditions of their
employment.
So, what about the question before the court? Having stressed the
centrality of organizing generally, how do we know whether organizing new
members is germane to the project of bargaining on behalf of existing
members? The opinion's reasoning is straightforward and flows from what
Judge Reinhardt terms "the realities of collective bargaining. "4 As he put it:
The specific question here involves organizing outside the . . .
bargaining unit, in particular the employees of competing employers.
Such organizing may be crucial to improving the wages, benefits, and
working conditions of employees in the bargaining unit .... The fact
that an employer's competitors are not unionized, and likely pay lower
wages and provide lesser benefits, significantly weakens the union's
ability to bargain with the employer, and decreases the union's
prospects of achieving the economic objectives of the members of the
bargaining unit.48
This statement is almost indisputably accurate-there is little question that a
union's ability to organize an increasing share of a market enhances its ability
to bargain on behalf of its existing members.49 By reading the statute, and the
relevant Supreme Court precedent, in light of these "realities," the UFCW
court is able to reach a result that captures the real-world germaneness of new
organizing: it is inseparable from collective bargaining because the outcomes of
collective bargaining depend entirely on the extent of organization.
In UFCW, then, we again see the commitment to protecting workers'
efforts to improve their work lives and the reliance on practical reasoning. The
46. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1036 v. NLRB, 307 F.3 d 760, 768 (9 th
Cir. 2002) (en banc).
47- Id.
48. Id. at 768-69.
49. See, e.g., RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONs Do? 51 (1984)
("[T]he union wage premium depends strongly on the percentage of workers who are
organized."); David G. Blanchflower & Alex Bryson, What Effect Do Unions Have on Wages
Now and Would Freeman and Medoff Be Surprised?, in WHAT Do UNIONs Do? A TWENTY-
YEAR PERSPECTIVE 79, 104 (James T. Bennett & Bruce E. Kaufman eds., 2007).
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UFCW case also highlights a final, broader component of the Reinhardt labor
jurisprudence: the Judge's commitment-in the face of profound social,
cultural, and political trends in exactly the opposite direction-to protecting
the collective rights of workers. Of course, when it passed the NLRA in 1935,
Congress declared it to be the policy of the United States to protect "the
exercise by workers of full freedom of association [and] self-organization ...
for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their
employment."o5 Section 7 of that statute, still very much the law today, grants
to employees the affirmative "right to self-organization, to form, join or assist
labor organizations, . . . and to engage in . . . concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection."5 ' Despite
the statutory commitment to collective action, however, there has been
significant judicial skepticism about, and hostility toward, the central project of
the NLRA. As many have recounted, both the Supreme Court and the courts of
appeals have interpreted the NLRA in ways that have dramatically curtailed the
statute's scope of coverage, the kinds of workers it protects, the type of conduct
it enables, and the range of remedies it offers." Although there are numerous
explanations for this judicial approach to the labor statute, it likely reflects (at
least in part) some discomfort with the facilitation of collective action-a kind of
"[d]iminished judicial respect for group action in the workplace,"" a
"deemphasis of the rights of the group in favor of those of individual
workers." 4
The UFCW case is illustrative of Judge Reinhardt's contrary position. The
case protects the collective rights of workers in a manner that requires some
sacrifice of the interests of individuals: bargaining unit members who object to
the union's use of their dues must pay up, irrespective of their objection. To be
sure, Judge Reinhardt-and the UFCW court-believe that the union is
requiring objectors to do something that ultimately will redound to the
objectors' own benefit. The opinion nonetheless stands out as quite distinct
50. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (20o6).
51. Id. § 157.
52. For some examples, see James J. Brudney, Reflections on Group Action and the Law of the
Workplace, 74 TEx. L. REV. 1563 (1996); Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner
Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978);
and Reuel E. Schiller, From Group Rights to Individual Liberties: Post-War Labor Law,
Liberalism, and the Waning of Union Strength, 20 BERKELEYJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (1999).
53. Brudney, supra note 52, at 1591. See generally JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS
IN AMERICAN LABOR LAw (1983).




from the more prevalent judicial privileging of individual rights and autonomy
over the collective interests and power of the union.ss
Three cases cannot fully capture a labor and employment jurisprudence
that - to date - includes more than i5o opinions. As the other Features in this
Tribute reflect, moreover, an abiding concern for the ways in which law can be
used to empower marginalized communities, and a judging style that strives to
be grounded in the everyday realities of the litigants, are not unique to Judge
Reinhardt's labor and employment cases; to the contrary, these commitments
appear across the full span of Judge Reinhardt's work. These three cases,
though, highlight two core themes of this jurisprudence: the Judge's
commitment to ensuring that law functions as a mechanism of worker
empowerment, and his pragmatic approach to interpreting labor and
employment statutes. The cases also reflect the centrality of Judge Reinhardt's
jurisprudence to the law of the workplace, a contribution that will endure long
beyond the Judge's extraordinary tenure on the bench.
55. Again, for an excellent historical account of this trend, see id.
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